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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture remains a dominant sector in the economies of most African and 
several Asian countries. However, the poor performance of agriculture in Africa 
stands in sharp contrast to the robust agricultural growth in many Asian countries.
2 
In this regard, the experience of China is perhaps as impressive as it is relevant to 
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. A general observation is that the productivity 
of land and labour has to rise through intensive agriculture, given the limited area of 
arable land (in China and Africa) and the high rates of growth of population (as in 
Africa). In many African countries, labour productivity has fallen and land 
productivity has not increased significantly. In China, productivities of both land and 
labour have increased significantly since at least the early 1980s.  
Agricultural output can increase in three ways: (i) get more from the same 
quantities of inputs through better utilisation of the existing capacity; (ii) use 
increased quantities of inputs; and (iii) use new techniques to raise the productivity 
of each input or raise the total product curve. All of these may require changes in 
tenurial arrangements, levels of investment in infrastructure and support services, 
and policies that affect the prices of outputs and inputs. A close examination of 
factors underlying the contrasting experiences in China and African countries 
reveals important differences in the institutional and policy environments affecting 
the individual behaviour with regard to the adoption and use of new (profitable) 
technologies to raise the land and labour productivities. This paper is intended to 
highlight the linkages between agricultural growth and the institutional, policy, and 
behavioural aspects, contrasting the experiences of China and African countries. 
 
  Mahmood Hasan Khan is Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University, Canada, and 
Mohsin S. Khan heads the Research Division at International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. 
 
1The Terms “Africa” or “African countries” refer to the Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
2A similar contrast can be observed generally in the rates of growth of population in African and 
Asian countries, with high and stable rates in the former and falling rates in the latter. II. MACROECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND 
AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE
3  
In 1992 the income per capita in China was $470 and in Africa $530. 
However, the average Chinese enjoyed a standard of living more than twice as high 
as an average African: $2,946 versus $1,250, using the purchasing power parity 
exchange rates [UNDP (1994)]. Nearly 46 percent of the population in Africa and 
only 9 percent in China are in absolute poverty. Poverty in rural areas–where 70-72 
percent of the people of Africa and China reside–is even more widespread in Africa: 
over 65 percent of the rural population in Africa (or 237 million people) and about 
13 percent in China (or 105 million people) live in poverty. Agriculture is the single 
most important sector of the African economies; its share in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has stayed between 30-35 percent in the last 25 years. In China, the 
share of agriculture in the GDP has fallen from around 40 percent to 27 percent in 
the same period. It is interesting that agriculture employs about two-thirds of the 
labour force in both Africa and China. The direct contribution of agriculture to trade 
(exports and imports) is even more significant in Africa (48-50 percent) than in 
China (28-30 percent). 
Africa’s population (518 million) in 1992 was just less than one-half of 
China’s. But the population gap has narrowed in the last 25 years: the population in 
Africa grew at rates of 2.7-3.0 percent per year during 1965-92, whereas the 
population growth rate in China fell from 2.1 percent to 1.4 percent per year in the 
same period. The Chinese economy expanded at 6.4 percent per year during 1965-80 
and 9.1 percent during 1980-92, which allowed the per capita income to rise 
annually at 3.3 and 7.4 percent in the two periods. The economies in Africa, on the 
other hand, grew at decelerating rates, falling from 5.3 percent in 1965-80 to 1.8 
percent during 1980-92. Given the rising rates of growth of population in African 
countries, the average income per capita rose annually at 2.6 percent in the first 
period but fell at the rate of 1.2 percent per year in the second period. 
The low growth rate of the GDP in Africa is mirrored by the poor performance 
of the agriculture sector: its annual growth rate was only 1.9 percent during 1965-80 
and fell to 1.7 percent during 1980-92. The indices of total agricultural output, food 
output, and crop output during 1975–92 (1979–81=100) strongly support the 
differential performance of the agriculture sector in Africa and China. In terms of food 
security, the situation in African countries seems to have deteriorated: the index of 
food output per capita fell from 108 in 1975 to 93 in 1992, but increased in China 
from 91 to 145. Cereal production per capita in Africa has likewise consistently 
declined from 169 kg in 1970 to 140 in 1993; it increased in China from 251 to 350 in 
this period. If net imports are added to the domestic production, the availability of 
cereals in Africa fell from 175 kg per person in 1970 to 150 in 1992, but rose 
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3The data used in this section are shown in Tables 1 and 2.consistently from 257 kg to 350 kg in China.
4 Africa had to import a sizable 
proportion of its own cereal output to avoid food disasters throughout the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. The food dependency ratio in China was less than one-half of that in 
Africa: it increased from 6.5 in 1970 to 10.2 in 1990 in Africa and from 1.7 to 4.7 in 
China. 
In view of the general economic decline in African countries between the late 
1970s and the early 1980s, several governments undertook economic reform–
stabilisation and structural adjustment–programmes with assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other international 
donors.
5 Admittedly, there is much controversy about the short- and long-term 
effects of these programmes on growth, poverty, and the environment. Recent 
evidence seems to suggest that in some of the African countries there has been 
visible economic recovery since the late 1980s.
6 However, looking at some of the 
major indicators of performance for the agriculture sector in 14 of these countries–
10 of which have received certificates of success from the World Bank–in recent 
years, only in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Benin the annual growth rate of food 
output was between 1.8 and 2.8 percent during 1980-92; in 3 countries there was a 
decline in the growth rate; and in others the rate of growth was less than 0.5 percent. 
In China, the annual growth of food per capita was 2.9 percent in the same period. 
While the index of food production per capita (1979-81=100) in 1991 was 
significantly higher in Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana than in other 
African countries, the average for Africa was 96 as against the average of 138 in 
China. The estimated growth rates of the value-added in agriculture during 1986-92 
show a disturbing trend in Africa: the average annual rate during 1986-89 was 7.3 
percent in the top 10 countries, but declined to 3.3 percent during 1989-92, the most 
recent period for which the data are available. In China, on the other hand, the 
annual growth rate of agriculture went up from 3.6 percent during 1986-89 to 4.6 
percent during 1989-92.               
Most of the observed difference in the performance of agriculture between 
Africa and China in the last 25 years can be attributed to changes in the productivity 
of major agricultural inputs.
7 For example, the agriculture value-added per hectare in 
China more than doubled (rose from $706 to $1906), but in Africa it rose by less 
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4The indices for Africa include the North African countries: Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Morocco. If the indices of these countries are excluded from the total, the picture is more depressing. 
 
5See [World Bank (1994a)]. 
 
6See, for instance, the two volumes on Sub-Saharan Africa by Husain (1994) and World Bank 
(1994). 
 
7Wen’s (1993) study of total factor productivity (TFP) in China’s agriculture shows that most of 
the growth in the 1950s came from increased inputs; followed by declining TFP during 1958–60 (“The 
Great Leap Forward”); some improvement from 1960–68 followed by deterioration and stagnation (“The 
Cultural Revolution”) upto 1977–78. The TFP index was at 70 (1952 = 100) in 1978. It has nearly 
doubled–risen from 70 to 140–during 1978 and 1992. There is no similar study of changes in TFP in 
African agriculture. than two-thirds ($346 to $566) during 1970-92. The average product per agricultural 
worker rose by 87 percent (from $206 to $385) in China and only 18 percent (from 
$456 to $540) in Africa in the same period. The yield gap of cereals between Africa 
and China rose consistently from 2.24 to 4.13 during 1970-93: in 1990-93 the 
average yields were around 1.1 and 4.3 metric tons per hectare, respectively. 
A part of the explanation for the rapid growth of agricultural production and 
productivity in China is reflected in the availability of irrigation water and use of 
chemical fertilisers. In Africa, less than 5 percent of the arable land is presently 
irrigated (rising from nearly 3 percent in 1970), whereas in China 51 percent of the 
area is irrigated (rising from 40 percent in 1970). The average rate of fertiliser 
(N+P+K) application is around 15 kg per arable hectare in Africa (rising from 7 kg 
in 1970) and 290 kg per hectare in China (rising from 36 kg in 1970). Similar 
differences seem to exist in the use of quality (hybrid) seed of major crops, 
pesticides, and machines. 
 
III. SOME EXPLANATIONS OF THE DIFFERENCES 
IN AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
The conventional wisdom in the 1950s was that China would face long 
periods of hunger and famine and the African continent will produce increasing 
agricultural surplus for rapid industrial growth. The events so far have run the other 
way. A substantial body of literature has recently developed on both China and 
African countries about the performance of their economies and the process of 
agricultural growth in the last 15-20 years.
8 It is important first to underscore some 
of the major differences in the resource endowments and structural conditions that 
have a strong bearing on the performance of agriculture in China and Africa. This 
will be followed by a review of the differences in the evolution of institutions and 
policies, investments in infrastructure, and development of support services. 
 
1. Structural Differences 
While African agriculture is largely rain-fed, China has the advantage of 
irrigation for a substantial proportion of its arable land. It is estimated, however, that 
Africa has a potential for irrigation to about 20-25 million hectares and only 15-20 
percent of that potential is presently used. Further, the yield level on irrigated lands 
in Africa is about 3.5 times the level observed on rain-fed lands [Cleaver (1993)]. 
There is not much potential for additional arable land in China. In fact, the land base 
has been shrinking in the last 20-25 years: it has gone down from 0.12 hectare to 
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8Some of the relevant literature is shown in the list of references and cited where necessary in the 
paper. 0.08 hectare per capita during 1970-92. The arable land base in Africa has expanded 
somewhat (132 million to 140 million hectares), but it is shrinking more rapidly in 
per capita terms thanks to the high rates of population growth and urbanisation: it 
has fallen from 0.49 to 0.28 hectare in this period. Much of the expansion of land 
base in Africa has been achieved at the expense of forest and pasture (grazing) lands. 
Natural disasters–floods and droughts–can severely damage agricultural 
production in any environment. Droughts, however defined, are both frequent and 
severe in many African countries as a result of the variability in rainfall in the arid 
and semi-arid areas and the poor capacity of soils to retain moisture. Many African 
countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of drought because of (i) 
dependence on rain-fed agriculture (crop and livestock production) and its 
importance to the GDP, (ii) limited infrastructure, (iii) low level of income per 
capita, and (iv) large-scale armed conflict or civil strife.
9 China has not encountered 
drought on this scale, although flooding in some years–as recent as 1991–has 
affected agricultural output on a significant scale in some regions. 
Until recently, in many African countries, because of the relative abundance 
of land in relation to population, “shifting” and “slash and burn” agriculture has been 
practised over large areas. Long rotations and a mix of pastoral and crop husbandry 
have adequately met the needs of people and their soils. However, with increased 
population, soil degradation, and generally low productivity, intensification of 
agriculture has become a necessity in most African countries. A transition from 
shifting to settled agriculture–shorter rotations–is now indeed under way, creating 
pressure on the natural resource base and on the traditional linkages between animal 
and crop husbandry. The traditional technologies and the customary land systems are 
unable to accommodate the needs of a rapidly growing population [Lele and Stone 
(1989)]. China, on the other hand, has known settled and intensive agriculture for 
centuries. In recent decades, the intensification of agriculture in China has 
progressed due mainly to productivity increases. The development of rural 
infrastructure–including irrigation–and the adoption of new labour-intensive (land-
augmenting) technologies in the 1960s and 1970s have made a major contribution to 
this process. 
Finally, the conditions for agricultural growth in China and African countries 
have differed in another, perhaps crucial, respect. The political and social stability–
with expanding institutional capacity of the government to promote the economic 
well-being of citizens–observed in China has not developed in Africa in the post-
independence period. On the contrary, in many African countries, the rules of good 
governance have generally been abused as is evident in civil strife, lawlessness, and 
the pervasive rent-seeking behaviour of governments, farmers, and businessmen on a 
large scale. As will be argued later in the paper, governments in many countries 
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9For an interesting study of the impact of drought in Africa, see Benson (1994).adopted the attitude–even when they lacked the institutional capacity–that rapid 
economic growth requires their visible hand and not the invisible hand of the market, 
and that the industrial cart must be placed before the agricultural horse. This strategy 
of economic development was a misinterpretation of recent history and, as it turns 
out, a prescription for failure. Here again the government in China has shown more 
flexibility and pragmatism than observed in Africa. 
 
2. Evolution of Institutions         
There is a general agreement that property rights in natural resources–
agricultural land, pastures, and forests–should be well-defined, understood and 
enforced to use the resources efficiently for the common good. “Open access” 
represents absence of property rights, results in wastage and degradation of 
resources, and may even perpetuate poverty. There is, however, much disagreement 
about the exact form of property rights (private, customary, and state): how have 
these forms evolved and which one of these is the “best” for the economy and 
society?
10 
Private property rights in agricultural land, as these exist in several countries 
outside Africa, imply exclusivity, security, and transferability: one can do what one 
likes, within limits, with one’s land as property. This right is recognised in law and 
enforced in practice. In the customary land system, as it exists in many African 
countries, a person or a household enjoys the usufruct of land, but not its ownership, 
by way of association with a tribe or through kinship. This right is transferable 
within the family through inheritance or within the tribe through tenancy in one form 
or another. The tribal authority regulates these rights by customary law and practice. 
In the third system, as it exists in china and some other countries, the right of land 
ownership belongs exclusively to the state. Individuals and groups may be assigned 
the rights of usufruct to specific pieces for a fixed period. These rights are not 
transferable between individuals and groups without the legal consent of the state. 
The users of land are simply tenants of the state under well-defined rights and duties. 
The traditional Chinese land system before the establishment of the People’s 
Republic in 1949 can best be described as “feudal”: much of the land was owned by 
landlords who leased it in small (fragmented) parcels to the landless peasants. A land 
reform programme was completed during 1949-1952, under which land was taken 
away from landlords without compensation and distributed free to the poor and 
landless peasants. The Communist party experimented with various forms of 
cooperatives, while retaining the private property right in land. Initially, the peasants 
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10Some of this literature is reviewed by Platteau (1992). There is considerable debate about the 
effects of farm size–economies or diseconomies of scale–and tenancy, sharecropping, fixed rent, and wage 
labour on agricultural productivity and rural income distribution. This debate goes back to the nineteenth 
century. 
 were encouraged (not forced) to join these cooperatives. The results of the 
experiment in “advanced cooperatives” were very positive in terms of the increase in 
the agriculture value-added and grain output during 1955 to 1957.  
The “people’s communes” were established in 1958 as large-scale collectives 
of peasants who lost the ownership of land, and with it the freedom to make 
decisions. After the disastrous failure of agriculture during 1959-61, causing 
widespread famine, hunger, and deaths on a very large scale, the communes were 
decentralised. Each commune was split into 13 “brigades” (with about 15,000 
people), and each brigade was divided into 7-10 “production teams”. There were 35 
households or about 60 workers in each production team, which became the basic 
operational and accounting unit for income distribution: each worker was rewarded 
on the basis of “work points” he/she accumulated. The commune system–in which 
the state owned the land, made decisions about crops, prices, and inputs and the 
peasants were rewarded on work points–remained intact until 1978. 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, there was considerable political 
uncertainty for about three years. By the end of 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his 
supporters in the Communist Party emerged as the successful leaders of China. A 
series of major reforms were introduced in 1978-1979 to improve the performance 
of the economy in general and the agriculture sector in particular [Harrold (1992)]. 
These reforms also reflected a break from the ideology of collectivism and 
egalitarianism previously pursued in rural areas. It was acknowledged that the key to 
farmers’ incentives was to solve the managerial problems in the team system. 
Rewards to individuals were not tied directly to their effort–because of the 
difficulties and the high cost of monitoring the agricultural work which is sequential 
and spatial–so the incentives for work were low and undercontribution to effort was 
pervasive.
11 
While the government initially considered subdivision of the collectively 
owned land into individual household parcels to be contrary to socialist principles, a 
small number of production teams–located in areas frequently visited by flood and 
drought–first secretly and then with the blessing of local authorities began the 
system of contracting land and other resources to individual households in return for 
output quotas and local taxes. These teams produced much higher yields than other 
teams in the same area. This “household responsibility system” (HRS) spread to 
other areas and official recognition was given to the new system in 1981. By the end 
of 1983 almost all rural households in China had adopted the HRS. Initially the 
households were given short-term leases of one to three years, but in 1984 the lease 
period was increased to 15 years. At the same time, sub-leasing of land and use of 
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11A formal explanation of the underlying theory and a test of some hypotheses about collective 
farms in China is given by Lin (1988). hired labour were permitted. The contracting household had to meet the quota 
obligations (as rent to the state) and pay the local taxes.
12 
Recent studies of the impact of economic reform in China have argued with 
good evidence that the institutional change from the commune system to HRS 
contributed about one-half of the increase in TFPI during 1979-1989. The rest was 
due to increased levels of inputs, resulting from the price incentive.
13 While the 
productivity effects of HRS have been generally recognised, there is a debate about 
its consequences on the distribution of rural income. A general impression is that the 
distribution of income in rural China has become more unequal since the advent of 
the economic reform programme [Khan et al. (1992); Lin (1994)]. Some of the 
inequality has been contributed by the marketed component of the household 
production; the rest is on account of the spread of rural industries, property income, 
and wage differentials.  
The land system in Africa is in a state of flux, creating much uncertainty 
about the property rights in agricultural land, pastures, and forests. It is hard to 
describe the land tenure of Africa both because of its diversity and the  changes 
under way with or without government action. The customary land system, before 
the imperial encroachments of Europeans into Africa in the nineteenth century, was 
based on the abundance of land relative to population. The right of landownership 
did not extend to the individual or household: they enjoyed secure and transferable 
rights to the use of land within the tribe or kinship group. Communal ownership of 
pastures, forests, and agricultural land was the common pattern. The technology 
used in agriculture–slash and burn and shifting cultivation with long fallow periods–
was consistent with the resource endowment and the institutional capacity of tribes 
and kinship groups. Land parcels, distributed to individual households on the basis 
of need and the size of household, were rotated among the households. 
Europeans introduced the ownership rights of individuals to agricultural land–
taken away from Africans usually by force–for settlers in Africa (e.g., Kenya, 
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the Ivory Coast) to grow commercial crops for 
export. Africans were generally allowed to maintain the customary land system and 
to produce mainly subsistence crops. In many areas, they were forced to provide 
labour to European farmers and commercial plantations. In several African 
countries, a dual land system had emerged by the early 1950s when the African 
states started to gain independence [Platteau (1992)]. 
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12A detailed account of institutional changes in China since 1949 and the government’s shifting 
policy on HRS in recent years is given by Ash (1993); Lardy (1990) and Stone (1993). 
 
13This general conclusion is reached in several studies, but a rigorous analysis is provided by Lin 
(1988) and Wen (1993). According to Wen (1993, p. 34), the “commune system was detrimental to [sic] 
and the HRS has been conducive to an increase in TFPI, and there was an outward shift of the production 
frontier following the dismantlement of the commune system”. It has also been argued that the 
institutional change has dynamic effects. In very few countries of Africa–Kenya is perhaps the best example–the post-
Independence governments have introduced and enlarged on a systematic basis the 
private (individual) right of landownership. A debate has often followed about the 
increasing concentration of land and landlessness. In some countries, agricultural 
land was taken away by the state from the tribal (communal) system and private 
landowners, as in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Nigeria. There is evidence that, in many 
African countries, the customary land system–which is still predominant–has lost 
much of its structure due to (i) the increasing pressure of population on arable land, 
(ii) the increased mobility of labour, (iii) the expansion of markets, (iv) the 
emergence of de facto tenancies in various forms within and outside the tribal and 
kinship groups, and (v) the lack of interest and inadequate institutional capacity of 
governments to restructure the customary land system.
14 
There is much uncertainty and insecurity of tenure in land throughout Africa, 
affecting the incentives to make long-term investments and adopt (new) profitable 
technologies where they have become available. It is this state of insecurity of 
tenure, and not necessarily the incapacity of the customary land system to adapt to 
changing circumstances, that inhibits agricultural growth in many African countries 
[Migot-Adholla  et al. (1993); Platteau (1992) and Smith et al. (1994)]. The 
transition from the communal to private property in land requires policies that can 
first arrest the decay of the customary land rights into an open access regime–as is 
clearly evident in pastures and forests–and provide a legal framework for property 
rights that are well-defined, secure, and transferable. Restrictions on rights by 
custom or law, in the face of rapid population growth and continuous cultivation, 
can have serious implications for investment in land and technological innovations 
in agriculture [Migot-Adholla et al. (1993)]. 
 
3. Prices and Markets 
In the early 1950s, four views came to dominate public policy in many 
developing countries: economic development means rapid industrialisation; rapid 
industrialisation requires transfer of resources from the agriculture sector through 
implicit and explicit taxes; import substitution is the key to rapid industrial growth; 
state controls and planning, and not private markets, are superior (and faster) 
vehicles for achieving the goals of development. In China, the Communist Party 
emulated the Soviet (Stalinist) model of development, with adaptation to local 
conditions and in keeping with the views of Mao Zedong, from the mid-1950s to the 
late 1970s. The socialist ideology allowed little or no room for private production 
and trade. In most African countries, after independence, governments adopted 
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14Burkina Faso is one of the few countries in which the government has started providing land 
titles to the traditional communities. policies that discrminated against agriculture, subsidised industry, and suppressed 
private markets through pervasive controls and regulations. 
A major difference between China and Africa was that the economy of China 
was far less dependent on foreign trade and was industrialising far more rapidly than 
the economies of most African countries. African countries were particularly 
vulnerable to changes in international markets since most of them depended on 
export earnings from a limited number of agricultural products (commercial crops) 
and imported most of the manufactured goods. Internally, the governments pursued 
policies that weakened the agricultural production system and did not necessarily 
diversify the economy efficiently. Many of these countries  had to start importing 
food in the early 1970s, whereas once they were exporters of grain, for which they 
were unable to earn adequate foreign exchange due to the falling terms of trade for 
their exports. Africa’s agricultural export performance deteriorated significantly 
from 1970 to 1984. This trend followed closely the high levels of distortions in the 
agricultural sector: government’s involvement in the pricing and marketing of export 
crops and the highly overvalued exchange rates. The rising food imports and 
declining domestic production were due to rapid urbanisation, exchange rate 
distortions, and a decline in international food prices and income [Jaeger (1992)].    
Until 1979 the Chinese leadership maintained a policy of food self-
sufficiency–which has been called “food fundamentalism”–particularly in grain 
production irrespective of the differences in regional comparative advantages. Also, 
it kept the producer prices of agricultural goods at levels which were far below the 
border prices to provide cheap food to industrial workers and urban consumers. 
Prices were administratively determined. Producers’ sales quotas were fixed. State 
purchase prices and state selling prices bore little relationship to each other. Prices 
were irrelevant to distribution, since commodities were allocated in a planned way 
through the administrative system. Finally, prices did not affect consumer behaviour, 
since supplies of key commodities were sold by allocated rations. 
The most important policy change in China began quietly in 1978, and with 
much fanfare in 1979, with price increases for producers to improve agricultural 
profitability and raise peasant incomes. Initially, the average increase for the quota 
prices was 17 percent and 41 percent for the above-quota prices. The procurement 
prices in 1981 were an average of 42 percent above those in 1977. The government 
also liberalised the procurement system: it progressively reduced the base targets for 
unified sales, restored the negotiated sales, and allowed greater freedom to sell the 
surplus production at negotiated prices or on the free market. In response, producers 
attempted to sell a greater proportion of their output in the higher-priced categories 
or on the free market. The trend towards liberalisation of the state procurement and 
pricing system was maintained: by 1991 about 50 percent of all agricultural products 
purchases took place at market prices; 20 percent were subject to state guidance 
442  Khan and Khan prices–where maximum and minimum prices were set, and 30 percent at state-
determined prices [Findlay et al. (1993)].
15 
The price and procurement reforms in China, combined with the institutional 
reforms, have had several important effects on the agriculture sector and the rural 
economy: farmers are allocating their resources more efficiently; production and 
productivity of crops and livestock products have been rising substantially; regional 
comparative advantages are being exploited more fully; inter-regional markets 
(network of markets) are developing rapidly; and rural incomes, savings, and 
investment have increased significantly [Findlay et al. (1993); Khan et al. (1992); 
Lardy (1990) and Lin (1994)]. The indirect effect of the economic reform 
programme in rural areas has been the rapid growth of non-agricultural enterprises, 
commonly known as township enterprises. Labour freed from agriculture was 
available to develop new types of production, spurred on by the higher returns from 
such investments. The phenomenal growth of these enterprises, owned by 
individuals and townships (local governments), is reflected in the fact that they 
accounted for 54 percent of the value of rural production and 25 percent of the value 
of national output in 1990 [Findlay et al. (1993)]. Rural enterprises represent a key 
element in China’s rural development strategy, providing inputs in agriculture, 
absorbing rural labour, producing for the market, and helping to raise rural incomes. 
It is fair to say that much of the blame for the deterioration of African 
agriculture can be placed on government policies which have shifted the internal 
terms of trade strongly against agriculture and created market distortions that 
reduced efficiency [Russell (1993) and Vyas and Casley (1988)]. Farmers in Africa 
faced probably the highest burden of taxation in the world until the mid-1980s 
through explicit taxes–low producer prices, export taxes, and taxes on agricultural 
inputs–and implicit taxes through overvalud exchange rates and high levels of 
industrial protection [World Bank (1994)]. The result was a shift of resources–
especially labour–out of the sector, and a decline in both public and private 
investment. The decline in Africa’s agricultural exports coincided with substantial 
and widespread macroeconomic distortions and the deteriorating real prices paid to 
farmers: lower real producer prices and higher real exchange rates had a 
proportionate impact on declining agricultural exports [Jaeger (1992) and World 
Bank (1994)]. Rising food imports were a reflection of slow growth in food 
production, urbanisation, and higher demand for imported food. 
Governments in Africa have intervened heavily in the production and 
marketing of export crops (cashew, cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, palm oil, tea, 
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15Initially the government did not pass on to consumers the price increases of basic (rationed) 
commodities (grains in particular). However, in 1991 the retail prices of grains and other farm products 
were increased significantly. It may also be noted that the compulsory procurement quotas were replaced 
by purchasing contracts between the state and farmers [Ash (1993) and Lin (1994)]. and tobacco) through marketing boards and parastatals. Most of the parastatals have 
enjoyed monopoly power in purchasing and exporting usually at prices not linked to 
the world market prices. In spite of the economic reforms undertaken in recent years, 
there are still serious barriers to private competition. Often the marketing boards 
retain a de facto monopoly through control over processing and privileged access to 
bank financing. Similarly, boards can squeeze out private agents by setting 
unprofitably low price margins and relying on the government to subsidise their 
losses. Even when competition in the domestic purchasing has been allowed, the 
government maintains control on the export of major crops (e.g., cocoa and coffee in 
the Ivory Coast). The operations of the parastatals and marketing boards have been 
very costly and inefficient [World Bank (1994)].    
The intervention of governments in the pricing and distribution of food crops 
was less pervasive but still substantial: in about 15 countries the intervention was 
heavy. In some countries, government intervention was restricted to marketing of 
imported foods (mainly wheat and rice) to urban consumers, having indirect effects 
on domestic producers. Evidence suggests that government controls on distribution 
and price were not very effective and the evasion through parallel markets was 
substantial [Jaeger (1992) and World Bank (1994)]. Food prices have been affected 
less than the prices of export crops by government policies due to (i) ineffective 
policy interventions and (ii) limited imports of cheap food. Trends in consumer food 
prices show that relative to border prices, at official exchange rates, domestically 
produced food crops were more expensive relative to imported wheat and rice in the 
1970s. As distortions in real exchange rates have declined and food markets have 
been liberalised in the last 6-8 years, prices of traded food crops have increased 
while the prices of non-traded crops (tubers and roots) have fallen. Policy reform in 
the pricing and distribution of food crops has been rapid in those countries that 
intervened heavily mainly because of the disastrous financial position of food crop 
marketing boards.
16 
Governments in several African countries have recently embarked on 
economic reform programmes, including corrections in the exchange rates and 
producer prices of both export and food crops, reducing the role of marketing boards 
and increasing participation by the private sector in the production and distribution 
systems. The results so far are quite mixed in terms of the impact of these changes 
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16Prices and distribution of agricultural inputs, chemical fertilisers in particular, have also been 
subject to heavy government intervention. Most of the inputs have been subsidised partly to compensate 
farmers for the excessive taxation of agricultural products and partly to give incentives to farmers to adopt 
new and profitable technologies. There is much debate about the price distortion–subsidy–on fertilisers in 
relation to the fertiliser use and the efficiency of the public distribution systems. Governments in Africa, 
as in other parts of the world (including China), have started to reduce gradually the levels of fertiliser 
subsidy and increase the participation of the private sector in the distribution system [World Bank (1994)]. on the performance of the agriculture sector [Husain (1994) and World Bank 
(1994)]. One reason is that no country in Africa has both good macroeconomic and 
agricultural policies: exchange rate distortions and government intervention in 
marketing are still prevalent in most of the countries. The other reason is that the 
response of farmers also depends on non-price factors: land tenure; physical and 
social infrastructure in rural areas; and support services. 
 
4. Infrastructure and Support Services 
Development of agriculture requires public and private investment in physical 
and social infrastructure and in support services of agricultural research and 
extension. The returns on physical infrastructure–canals for irrigation, roads and 
railways for transport–are usually high since they increase the net returns on the 
production and marketing of agricultural products. The multiplier (secondary) 
effects of a well-developed and well-maintained transport and communications 
system are also substantial [World Bank (1994a)]. Similarly, investment in rural 
education and health care has high returns, provided the quality of output is good. 
Effective agricultural research and extension services, provided by the public and 
private sectors, also have a significant impact since they introduce new production 
technologies that increase productivity and incomes. These infrastructural inputs and 
services tend to complement their positive effects on the agriculture sector and the 
rural economy. The cumulative direct and indirect effects strengthen the linkages 
between sectors in the overall economy.  
The contrast between China and Sub-Saharan African countries with regard to 
the development of rural infrastructure and agricultural support services is quite 
revealing. For one thing, a much higher proportion of the GDP in China than in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been saved and invested for decades and the trend has been 
rising for the former and declining for the latter. 
 
 Saving    Investment   
 1970  1992  1970  1992 
Sub-Saharan Africa  18  15  20  16 
China       28       39              27  36 
 
The data on public and private investment in building the rural physical and 
social infrastructure are either scanty or unavailable. A general impression is that in 
Sub-Saharan Africa the levels of investment and the returns on these investments 
have been significantly lower than in Asian countries, including China. It is also 
acknowledged that the density of roads and railways and the quality of transport 
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Bank (1989) and (1994a)]. Comparative data on investment in rural health and 
education, and on the quality of these services, are not available. 
The development of the irrigation infrastructure and the supply of new 
technologies, based on agricultural research and transmitted through extension 
services, are normally undertaken by the public sector in most developing countries. 
Governments in many countries also spend substantial funds out of their budgets on 
the subsidies for credit and agricultural inputs as incentives for farmers. A consistent 
set of data for government spending on these activities are not available for many 
countries. However, the best estimates of the share of agriculture (including water 
development) in total government spending in Sub-Saharan Africa and China in the 
last two decades show significant disparities.   
 
Spending on Agriculture as  Percent of Total Government Spending 
    1970  1975  1980 1985 1988  1991 
Sub-Saharan Africa   –   7.3  7.1  6.4  7.5  – 
China 7.6  12.1  12.4  8.3  –  8.2 
 
The basic indicators of water development in China show rapid progress 
during the Maoist period. The irrigated area increased rapidly in the 1950s and 
1960s, with locally organised small-scale projects and publicly funded construction 
of large-scale surface structures. Tubewell development in the late 1960s and 1970s 
supplemented these investments. Similarly, the flood control and drainage efforts 
were significant. These incentives contributed to the expansion of high-yielding 
varieties (HYVs) of wheat, rice, and corn. In the post-Maoist period, the growth of 
irrigated area stagnated, as did the proportion of pumping facilities, for a decade. 
The immediate causes were contraction in public spending on new construction; 
inability of the local governments to fill the gap; and institutional changes–
replacement of communes by HRS–making the renovation and management of the 
infrastructure more difficult. In view of the negative impact of the decline in 
irrigation and irrigated area on multiple cropping and yield levels, the provincial and 
local governments started to mobilised funds and people in 1987 to construct, 
restore, and renovate the irrigation system [Stone (1993)]. 
Africa has limited irrigation, which tends to act as a major constraint on the 
introduction of new technologies and inputs. However, there is substantial potential 
for irrigation, drainage, and water storage in many countries which have 
predominantly arid and semi-arid conditions. Many irrigation schemes in Africa 
446  Khan and Khan have tended to be extremely expensive by world standards. Often the government 
agencies maintaining the irrigation systems are underfunded and perform no better 
than other parastatals. Generally, the large-scale schemes have been more poorly 
designed, constructed, maintained, and operated than the small-scale schemes. Less 
complex, small-scale irrigation schemes, run by individuals or communities, appear 
to be more productive and viable [Cleaver (1993)].  
China’s experience with the introduction of HYVs and use of water and 
fertiliser during the Maoist period was quite impressive. In the 1950s, the 
government undertook ambitious and basically well-oriented programmes to import 
desirable varieties from abroad and selective local cultivars for rapid dissemination 
and it set up a national network for breeding, testing, producing, and diffusing 
HYVs. During the 1960s and 1970, in spite of the excesses and unconventional 
management practices associated with the Cultural Revolution, the system for 
breeding, local testing, and adaptation became well-established and dispersed 
throughout China. The post-Maoist period inherited a highly developed, broadly-
based research system for providing and extending a stream of increasingly 
productive varieties of major food crops (wheat, rice, and corn). 
The agricultural extension system in China operated quite effectively until the 
reforms of the early 1980s. The service was undertaken by a handful of agriculturists 
together with the peasants employed as agricultural technicians assigned to 
specialised stations to carry out verification trials, demonstrations, and training of 
farmers working in the production teams under the commune system. 
Decollectivisation has posed problems for the extension system: the shift from a top-
down model–linked through the commune system–to a client-oriented model–linked 
to the HRS–has been difficult. A major difficulty has been the reduced funding to 
both research and extension services since the early 1980s. coordination between 
extension and input supplies has broken down and the links between education, 
research, and extension have become weaker.
17 
Most of the modest agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan African countries has 
been contributed by the expansion of cultivated area on which the increasing 
agricultural population has used traditional methods of production. There has been 
some expansion of irrigation (e.g., in Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Swaziland, and 
Madagascar), but the use of fertiliser has remained remarkably low. The Green 
Revolution has not come to Africa. There have been major constraints on the 
demand for and the supply of improved agricultural technologies. On the demand 
side, the constraints have been bad macroeconomic and pricing policies, shifting 
cultivation, poor soil and water conditions, inadequate financial resources to buy the 
needed inputs, and poor infrastructure linking the farms to the markets.  
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17Accounts of the recent problems in China are given by Johnson (1990); Lin (1994) and Stone 
(1993). The government has started a major reorganisation of the research and extension services.On the supply side, a scrutiny of successful innovations in Africa shows them 
to have been taken up in relatively narrow areas, suggesting the importance of 
adaptation to specific situations [Smith et al. (1994)]. Until the 1960s, the primary 
emphasis of the modest agricultural research systems was on export crops. In the 
1970s, the emphasis shifted to food crops. The national agricultural research 
centres–based mainly on donor assistance–were established in the 1980s. In recent 
studies, it has been found that the research institutes are poorly funded, contain 
research programmes with little relevance to agricultural needs, and do not 
collaborate with one another [Cleaver (1993)]. The agricultural extension services in 
Africa are run by the public sector, usually as a large but ineffective agricultural 
bureaucracy. The donor-assisted experiments on agricultural extension in Africa 
through commodity projects and programmes in the 1960s and 1970s were likewise 
major failures. They were not responsive to the specific needs of farmers. Effective 
extension services have made a difference in some situations, e.g., public sector 
extension services for hybrid corn in Kenya and Zimbabwe, cotton in West Africa, 
and soil conservation in Burkina Faso; and private companies extension services for 
tea, rubber, and tobacco in Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe. The training and 
visit (T&V) extension system recently established in 27 African countries is 
supposed to overcome the constraints on transferring productive and profitable 
technologies to farmers.
18   
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1.   
Professor Mahmood Khan has excellently portrayed the contrasting 
performance of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa and China. His explanations of the 
former’s poor performance as against the robust agricultural growth in China are 
also borne out by evidence contained in various World Bank reports, some of which 
are cited by the author and in publications elsewhere. The recently published 
UNCTAD’s LDC 1995 Report also endorses Professor Khan’s explanations, which 
run in terms of differences in resource endowments, structural conditions, evolution 
of institutions and policies, private and public investments in infrastructure, and 
development of support services between the two regions. There is hardly any scope 
for disagreement on these issues. Africa suffered chronic disadvantages in all these 
areas which constrained the growth not merely of the region’s agriculture, but of 
manufacture and other activities as well. 
What is, however, most striking in Professor Khan’s paper is that he has tried to 
draw a comparison between the incomparables. China’s vast continental size, large 
population, high resource endowment, and long years of relative political stability do 
not leave much scope for making any meaningful comparison between her and Sub-
Saharan Africa, which is dissimilar in every imaginable aspect. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
32 out of the 46 countries are least developed with very fragile economies. There are 
also countries with large geographical areas (Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire, Mali, Niger, Sudan, 
Mauritania, and Angola) as there are countries of very small size. There are again 
populous economies (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zaire, Sudan, and Kenya), as there 
are countries with very small populations such as Guinea-Bissau, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, and Sao Tomé and Principe. Thus, even within Africa 
there are glaring disparities for which a meaningful deduction is difficult to make. Each 
country has its own distinct problems and inherent weaknesses for which solutions 
have to be found to suit their own conditions. Policy actions that have been ideal for 
China can hardly be replicated to Africa, not even to those places that are relatively 
better endowed with resources. 
While the root causes of Africa’s poor agricultural performance have been aptly 
diagnosed in Professor Khan’s paper, no remedy or appropriate line of action to 
overcome these ills is suggested therein. Appropriate solutions to Africa’s manifold 
problems are not easy to find, but the paper could at least provide some guidelines or a 
direction for policy in the area. African economies have heterogeneous problems, and 
even though most of these countries adopted reform measures, such reforms were not 
always designed to suit their conditions and hence have failed to lift the structural 
constraints facing these countries. Severe political conflicts, civil strife, large-scale 
displacements of populations, and a breakdown of the system of governance resulted in 
output loss in all sectors and impoverished the people (e.g., Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia ad Sudan). Unless these problems are solved, economic reform can hardly activate the 
development process of these countries.     
Not all African countries are, however, strife-torn, but unfavourable natural 
factors affected agricultural production in many of these countries, particularly in 
those where rain-fed agriculture is the most important sector. The poor production 
performance has been matched almost equally by their disappointing export 
performance, a consequence of sharply declining international prices of major 
agricultural commodities. A way of out this could be to undertake product 
diversification to increase the production of high value-added, income-elastic 
exports of agricultural products. Unfortunately, diversification, as is being currently 
tried by some countries, such as Benin, Madagascar, Siera Leone, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique, is constrained by the lack of skills and 
investment resources  as well as difficulties to penetrate export markets.  
It is unfortunate, as the author has rightly observed, that the Green Revolution 
technologies have largely bypassed Africa, although the adoption of new 
technologies has contributed significantly to agricultural growth in many Asian 
countries. A notable example is Bangladesh, which has achieved near self-
sufficiency in food through a widespread use of HYVs of rice, improved farming 
and irrigation methods, and more efficient application of fertilisers.  
With appropriate policies, it is not difficult to achieve a 2-3 percent growth in 
agricultural production, as evidence of successful regions and countries elsewhere 
indicates. These policies include satisfactory producer prices, high-yielding 
technologies, improved marketing, more effective research and extension, and 
bigger investments in infrastructure. 
African countries need to increase both agricultural production and 
productivity. While more arable land and cropping intensity will raise crop 
production, additional factors such as the adoption of yield-increasing technology, 
the intensification of production through irrigation, and increased use of chemical 
fertilisers can bring about a significant increase in food production. African 
countries have mad every little use of these, and hence there is little fear of adverse 
environmental effects.  
Attributing much of Africa’s poor agricultural performance to price 
distortions and inefficient price interventions that discriminated against agriculture, 
the author casually refers to the need for appropriate agricultural price reforms 
aiming at restoring producer incentives. Such reforms, however, are concerned not 
only with raising prices of agricultural output but also with removing producer 
support, e.g., subsidies for fertilisers and credit. The latter have the effect of raising 
the production cost and hence offsetting the incentives provided to output. There is a 
long-drawn controversy about the continuation or withdrawal of subsidies but a 
general conclusion is that correcting relative prices through structural adjustment 
452  Ayubur Rahman Bhuyan measures is in conflict with the objective of increasing agricultural output and 
exports. In fact, price incentives cannot raise supply elasticities for long unless these 
are accompanied by non-price complementary measures to improve capabilities in 
the areas of research, extension service, marketing, storage, transport, etc. 
Africa’s agricultural problems are too complex to be solved by a single 
stroke. The major thrust should be on creating an infrastructure and a policy 
environment that would allow increased production in those commodities in which 
the countries have a comparative advantage. There is also the need to strengthen the 
capacity of national agricultural research systems. Regional cooperation among 
national research institutes should be promoted so that they can develop or adapt the 
technologies that Africa needs. Environmental concerns should also be duly 
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The current big success story in development is China, while the continuing 
failure is Sub-Saharan Africa. Mahmood Hasan Khan provides a wealth of data and 
interpretation that is valuable to understanding what can or cannot be done to 
achieve accelerated growth, and what the principal hurdles will be in getting Sub-
Saharan Africa onto a sustained, sustainable growth path. The paper is clear that the 
purpose is to minister to Africa. But, the paper has a potential value to Pakistan as 
well, lying as it does between the striking success of China and the tragic failure of 
Africa. These remarks address that potential.  
China’s current success follows a three decades-long period of secular 
stagnation, marked by alternating periods of major setbacks and recovery. At the 
time, many China experts as well as the more general public saw the great leap 
forward and the cultural revolution as innovatory approaches to development that 
were succeeding and should be emulated. That long period was associated with 
general euphoria about China’s development–euphoria that could be supported only 
by taking the sum of discrete periods of recovery from sharp decline as sustained 
growth. But, the average growth rate in agriculture for the period from the post-
recovery point of the mid-1950s to the end of the 1970s was less than that of South 
Asian countries. Thus, one should be permitted a bit of cynicism as to whether the 
current surge is real and sustainable.  
However, unlike the earlier recoveries, this one has already far surpassed 
previous peaks, and shows no sign of losing steam. And, unlike earlier periods, the 
statistics on growth, consumption, shifts in consumption patterns, and trade all seem 
fully consistent with each other. 
Since 1980, as the author shows, agricultural output grew at 2.9  percent per 
capita of the total population. It is a substantial rate of growth per capita that tells us 
that agriculture is playing an important role in the economic transformation through 
its direct and indirect effects. For Pakistan to do comparably well, given its high 
population growth rate, would require about a 5.5  percent overall growth rate in 
agriculture–a rate achieved by Pakistan in the past, but far above the current level.  
The deterioration of Pakistan’s agricultural growth since the mid 1980s was 
initially masked by an extraordinarily high growth rate in cotton (and to some extent 
livestock and horticulture), but all the other major commodities were declining in 
growth rate, generally to less than the population growth rate. It was only a matter of 
time before the cotton growth rate declined to more nearly normal levels (to say 
nothing of ceasing entirely for a period) and thereby unmasked the poor growth in 
the bulk of agriculture. To emulate China, Pakistan’s agriculture and its major 
component parts must be put back on the growth path. 
One other strong feature of China’s growth comes out of the paper. 
Agriculture has had strong multipliers on other elements of the rural sector in China. 
Thus, 54  percent of the rural value-added is in the non-agricultural sector, and that represents 25  percent of the national product. Over half of all value-added is in the 
rural sector. Punjab has had a similar experience; but with the slowing of agriculture, 
its stimulus on other sectors will also slow down, and is indeed beginning to slow 
down. Agriculture’s strong positive multipliers also have their down side. 
What have been the major sources of the current high growth rates in China’s 
agriculture? Credit is now given largely to the economic liberalisation and the return 
of farmer incentives. But, it is important to realise that agriculture has sprung 
forward with those critical changes because other factors had already been taken 
care of. It is also well to recognise that after a long period of stagnation  agriculture 
was ripe for a period of greatly accelerated “catch-up growth” as the missed 
opportunities accumulated over decades were suddenly availed of.  
The favourable features established over the preceding decades were: (1) an 
egalitarian rural social structure that facilitated the development of local government 
and community action; (2) a high level of education, with essentially all of the rural 
population in the early working ages literate, and many with intermediate-level 
education; (3) an excellent system of village-to-market roads and other physical 
infrastructure, including rural electrification and telephones; (4) an effective 
agricultural research system with its complements of direct farmer contact and good 
basic research; (5) and, most important to the early surge of output, a massive 
increase in fertiliser availability from the huge investments of the 1970s. Indeed, 
increased fertiliser supply accounts for a good half of the increased agricultural 
output in the recent surge of agricultural growth. In that context, liberalisation 
released enormous rural energy. A small aside: with land area so limited and yields 
already high, and a previously enforced subsistence mentality, growth in the recent 
past has depended substantially on the shift in composition of agricultural output to 
high-value horticulture and livestock. 
Africa is of course deficient in all these elements, although many African 
countries are now making investments in education at a far higher level and with 
better results than in Pakistan. Pakistan is intermediate on most of the factors that led 
to success in China. What are the issues for Pakistan? 
It is not reasonable to think of Pakistan achieving the degree of rural equality 
achieved by China, nor the means chosen. But, one should ask: How does inequality 
in income and power in rural Pakistan impede the development of essential 
community organisation and action, and what ameliorative steps are needed to solve 
the problem at least to the point of proceeding with rapid growth? 
Of course, the lesson of the need for massive rural infrastructure investment is 
clear and needs to be emulated. Rural education too is widely understood to be the 
Achilles’ heal of Pakistan’s development. The Pakistan research/extension system 
does not seem poor relative to the general standards of developing countries, but to 
match China it needs to move upstream to more basic research (e.g., a strong 
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needs to move closer to the farmer for feedback and improved research. Pakistan has 
a special problem, generally not faced by China, of water allocations and quality. 
That requires institutional changes for which China provides only a portion of the 
answer. These few areas, requiring a major change in investment and institutional 
structures, are in total a large task, not easily carried out. A sense of strategy and 
commitment to rural growth are essential to succeeding at such large tasks. 
One can learn from China. The basis for much of the lesson is in this paper, 
aimed at Africa but capable of hitting the Pakistan target as well. But 
implementation is complex, and requires commitment and priority. 
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